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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
__________ 
 
No. 16-3877 
__________ 
 
RICHARD COPPOLINO, 
                                  Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE* 
 
*Amended pursuant to F.R.A.P. 43(c) 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court Civil No. 2-16-cv-00249) 
District Judge:  Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 May 9, 2017 
 
BEFORE:  AMBRO, RESTREPO, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: May 25, 2017) 
__________ 
 
OPINION* 
__________ 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
  
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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At its core, the legal doctrine of res judicata prohibits a second bite at the litigation apple.  
This well-known doctrine proscribes a second lawsuit that is based on the same causes of 
action as a prior suit where the prior suit involved the same parties, or their privies, and 
where there has been a final judgment on the merits in the first case.  Labelle Processing 
Co. v. Swarrow, 72 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 1995).1  We agree with the District Court that 
a state court action filed by Appellant Richard Coppolino involved the same causes of 
action he tried to bring against the same parties in federal court and, consequently, his 
federal suit is barred by res judicata.  We will, therefore, affirm.  
 Coppolino is a convicted sex offender and, in April of 2013, filed a challenge to 
the latest iteration of Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law statute (Megan’s Law IV) in state 
court.  He argued that Megan’s Law IV was an impermissible ex post facto punishment 
and, when applied to him, was unconstitutionally overbroad.  Frank Noonan, the 
Commissioner of the Pennsylvania State Police (and our Appellee here), was the named 
respondent in Coppolino’s state court proceedings.  The Pennsylvania Commonwealth 
Court addressed Coppolino’s ex post facto claim in detail, and denied him relief.  See 
Coppolino v. Noonan, 102 A.3d 1254, 1263-69 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014).  Coppolino 
appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s 
decision in a brief order.  Coppolino v. Noonan, 125 A.3d 1196 (Pa. 2015).   
                                              
1 Res judicata includes the legal concepts of claim preclusion and issue preclusion.  Claim 
preclusion prevents the relitigation of identical cases, whereas issue preclusion prevents 
the relitigation of discrete issues.  Here, the District Court analyzed this case through the 
lens of claim preclusion and we will apply that same analysis here. 
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 Two months after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the denial of his 
claims, Coppolino filed a civil rights action in the District Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 against Noonan.  He alleged that Megan’s Law IV retroactively punished him for 
past actions in violation of the ex post facto clause and also that his rights to due process 
were violated because the state statute was vague and overbroad.  The District Court, 
after a hearing on the matter, dismissed Coppolino’s case based on res judicata.  
Specifically, it concluded that Coppolino fully litigated the ex post facto and due process 
claims in state court and that any amendment to his complaint would be futile.  
Coppolino timely appealed. 
 We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal because of its 
procedural posture—a motion to dismiss based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6)—and because of the legal basis for the dismissal, res judicata.  See e.g., Allah v. 
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000); Morgan v. Covington Twp., 648 F.3d 172, 
177 (3d Cir. 2011).2   
 The preclusive effect of a state court judgment in a subsequent federal lawsuit is 
determined by the Full Faith and Credit Statute.  Metro. Edison Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. 
Comm’n, 767 F.3d 335, 350 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738).  That statute 
mandates that state judicial proceedings “shall have the same full faith and credit in every 
court within the United States ... as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State . 
. . from which they are taken.”  Id.  The United States Supreme Court has interpreted this 
statute to require federal courts to look to state law to determine the preclusive effect of a 
                                              
2 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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prior state judgment.  Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 
380–81 (1985).  Therefore, we look to Pennsylvania law on res judicata to determine 
whether it applies in this case. 
 Under Pennsylvania law, and in the context of § 1983 cases, res judicata applies to 
claims previously litigated in state court.  Indeed, we have instructed that where a litigant 
raises federal constitutional claims in a state court (as opposed to bringing those claims to 
federal court via a § 1983 case), res judicata may bar that litigant from relitigating those 
claims in the federal forum.  Lehman v. Lycoming Cty. Children’s Serv. Agency, 648 F.2d 
132, 145-46 (3d Cir. 1981), aff’d 458 U. S. 502 (1982).  Put another way, Coppolino’s 
suit is barred by res judicata only if a Pennsylvania court would bar his complaint on res 
judicata grounds under Pennsylvania law.   
 For res judicata to apply, Pennsylvania courts require the two actions to share the 
following characteristics: “(1) the thing sued upon or for; (2) the cause of action; (3) the 
persons and parties to the action; and (4) the capacity of the parties to sue or be sued.” 
Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments III, L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 548 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing 
Bearoff v. Bearoff Bros., Inc., 327 A.2d 72, 74 (1974)).  Res judicata bars Coppolino’s 
present suit.  First, in both his state and federal cases, Coppolino challenges the 
constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s Megan’s Law IV on ex post facto and due process 
grounds.  Second, the causes of action in the state suit are the same as those raised in the 
federal litigation:  in this action, Coppolino’s ex post facto claim asserts that Megan’s 
Law IV “creates or enhances penalties that did not exist when [his] offenses were 
committed.”  App. at 23a.  The Commonwealth Court decided that identical issue: 
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whether “Megan’s Law IV constitutes an impermissible ex post facto law as to 
Coppolino, where he completed his sentence prior to the enactment o these new 
provisions.”  Coppolino, 102 A.3d at 1263.  His due process claims are also identical.  
Coppolino claims that, by requiring the disclosure of internet identification, Megan’s 
Law IV violates his privacy and is “vague, ambiguous and fails to sufficiently define its 
terms such that ordinary people can understand a person’s . . . obligations under the law.”  
For its part, the Commonwealth Court’s decision resolves this very issue:  the state 
statute is “not overbroad with respect to the requirement that registrants disclose their 
Internet identifiers,” and further concludes that “the requirement that registrants disclose 
their Internet identifiers does not burden the right to anonymous speech.”  Id. at 1285.  
Third, Coppolino and Noonan are the identified parties in both cases.  It is of no import, 
contrary to Coppolino’s suggestion, that Commissioner Noonan has now been replaced 
by Commissioner Blocker.  It is the office that is being sued, not the individual officer, 
and such substitutions are pro forma under our federal rules.  See Fed. R. App. P. 43(c); 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).3  Fourth, there is no argument that Coppolino has the capacity to 
sue and that Noonan be sued.  In the end, the District Court properly thwarted 
Coppolino’s attempt at a second bite at the apple, and properly dismissed his case. 
                                              
3 Coppolino contends that the District Court committed reversible error by its refusal to 
permit him to amend his complaint to sue Commissioner Noonan in his individual 
capacity.  Not so.  Amendment would have been futile because any such claim would 
have been barred by the applicable statute of limitations.  See Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 
626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009).  And Coppolino makes no allegation that Commissioner Noonan 
was personally involved in the alleged wrongdoing, as he must be before he can be on the 
hook for monetary damages under § 1983.  See, e.g., Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 
353 (3d. Cir. 2005).   
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 We will affirm. 
